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In 1980, Victoria Hansel was hired by the Comanche Power Plant in
Pueblo, Colorado.' She was hired as an auxiliarytender,a position only one
other woman held at that time.2 On Victoria'sfirst day of work, thevlant
manager told her, "Ican't begin to prepareyou for what you're infor.
Soon thereafter, Victoria became the victim of what was described as a
"continuous and concerted campaign of sexual harassment and
discrimination.
"4 She was continually grabbed and fondled by her male
co-workers, who laughedat herwhen she told them to stop. On more than one
occasion, Victoria was held down by a co-worker as the others sexually
assaultedher.5 One co-workereven followed her into the ladies' restroomwith
a hangman's
noose, and told Victoria it would be better if she just killed
6
herself.

When Victoria told her supervisorshe was being sexually harassed,he told
her to "work on your peer relations" and try to "fit in better. 7 8Another
supervisorlatersuggested that Victoria carrya knife for protection.
Not surprisingly,the sexual harassmentcontinued.
Victoria again approachedher supervisor regarding these incidents. The
constant harassmentbegan to seriouslyaffect her work and personallife.9 She
felt continuallyfearful and threatenedat work, which made it hardfor her1to
concentrateon her tasks. Victoriaeven consideredsuicideduring thisperiod. 0
As she was describing to her doctor the vicious physical and mental
harassmentshe had suffered, she became hysterical,and was hospitalizedlater
that day for a nervous breakdown. Victoria returned to work a month later,
only to be called a "mental case' 11 andfacefurther ridiculeand harassment.
When formal sexual harassment charges werefied against the plant, the
harassment became worse. Sexually explicit graffiti and cartoons, much
12 of
them directed at Victoria by name, were plastered all over the plant. One
sign, posted in a control room, said: "SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THIS

1The facts of this narrative are taken from Hansel v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F. Supp.

1126, 1128-31 (D. Colo. 1991).
2This was also the highest position held by a woman at the plant. Id. at 1128.
3

Id.

4

1d.

5

Hansel, 778 F. Supp. at 1128-29.

61d.
7

at 1129.

Id.

81d. at 1130.
9

Hansel, 778 F. Supp. at 1129.

lOId. at 1129.
hId.
12 Id. at 1130.
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AREA WILL NOT BE REPORTED HOWEVER, IT WILL BE
13
GRADED.
I. INTRODUCTION

The result of this disturbing narrative? The Comanche Power Plant was
found liable by a federal district court for allowing such sexually harassing
behavior to permeate the working environment. 14 The more important, yet
often ignored question: how was Victoria affected by this "severe physical and
psychological abuse?"15 She was diagnosed by two psychologists as suffering
from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,16 a stress response syndrome found in
17
patients who have suffered a severe trauma.
Unfortunately, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is a common result in women
who have suffered sexual harassment in the workplace. 18 Even more
unfortunate is the fact that sexual harassment is not universally recognized as
an emotionally, physically, and psychologically damaging experience that can
cause severe trauma in its victims.
Women have been the victims of sexual discrimination in the workplace
since the day they entered the workforce. 19 This discrimination has taken the
form of unequal pay,20 allocation of work of lesser importance than men, 21 and
systematic sexual harassment. 22 While some forms of sex discrimination in the

13Hansel, 778 F. Supp. at 1130.
14

1d. at 1132.

15Id. at 1133.
16
1d. at 1131.
17

See discussion infra part III.

18See, e.g., Kauffmann v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178,181 (6th Cir. 1992); Campbell
v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co., 893 F.2d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 1990); Broderick v. Ruder,
685 F. Supp. 1269,1273 (D.D.C. 1988); Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F.Supp 853,866-67
(E.D.Okla. 1985); Buddle v. Heublein, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Daum
v. Lorick Enterprises, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 559, 560 (N.C. 1992); see also discussion infra part
III.
19LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB
12, 28-44 (1978); see also KATHLEEN NEVILLE, CORPORATE ATTRACTIONS 166 (1990).

20"Despite the many gains women and minorities have made in the workplace since
the enactment of Title VII, they still earn only about two-thirds of what white males earn."
H.R.REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
558.
21
As of 1988, women only held 39.3% of all executive level positions, while they held
80.1% of administrative support positions. H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 20
(1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,553; seealso Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,987
(1977) (acknowledging studies that show women are placed in less challenging, less
responsible and less remunerative positions based solely on gender).
22

CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF STATE 244 (1989).

MacKinnon is a prominent advocate that sexual harassment is a form of sex
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
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workplace have been specifically addressed by Congress, 23 sexual harassment
of women 24 by their employers 25 remains one of the most pervasive problems
confronting society today.26 Over 38,500 sexual harassment cases have been
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2 7 since 1980,28
which indicates a 200% rise from the previous decade. 29 Until the legislature,
discrimination, and has published numerous studies and books documenting the
problem.
23
See, e.g., The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38,77 Stat. 56 (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988)) (requiring employers to pay their employees the same wages
for "equal work" regardless of sex).
24

Since commonly the perpetrators of sexual harassment are male and the victims
are female, this Note will address a complainant as female. See NANCY DODD MCCANN
& THOMAS A. MCGINN, HARASSED, 100 WOMEN DEFINE INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR INTHE
WORKPLACE 73 (1992) (stating that 85-909/6 of reported sexual harassment is directed
toward women); MARCIA M. BOUMIL & STEPHEN C. HICKS, WOMEN AND THE LAW 453
(1992) (stating that the victims of sexual harassment are usually women); CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 28 (1979) (stating that women
are disproportionately the victims of sexual harassment); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43
STAN. L. REV. 813, 821, 822 nn. 26-28 (1991).
25Workplace sexual harassment may also be practiced by coworkers, customers and
clients. However, this Note will address harassment by an employee in a supervisory
position, commonly referred to as the "employer."
26

Numerous studies and surveys have documented the pervasiveness of sexual
harassment in the workplace. One of the first surveys, published by REDBOOK magazine
in 1976, reported that of 9,000 respondents, 92% listed sexual harassment as a serious
problem, and nine out of ten reported a personal experience with sexual harassment in
the workplace. FARLEY, supra note 19, at 20.
A 1987 survey reported that 42% of women and 14% of men employed by the
federal government said they experienced some form of sexual harassment. U.S. MERIT
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN
UPDATE 11 (1988). Sexual harassment cost the Federal Government $267 million from
May 1985-1987 due to the costs of replacing employees, paying for sick leave and
reduced work productivity. Id. at 4.
A 1988 survey of Fortune 500 companies conducted by WORKING WOMAN
magazine stated that almost 90% of the respondents reported receiving complaints of
sexual harassment from employees. ELLEN BRAVO & ELLEN CASSEDY, THE 9 TO 5 GUIDE
TO COM BATTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT5 (1992). Sexual harassment costs a typical Fortune
500 company $7 million a year due to absenteeism, lower productivity and employee
turnover. Id. at 49. This figure does not include the cost of defending lawsuits. Id.
A more recently published survey found that 45% of women and 19% of men said
they have been sexually harassed at work. SAMUEL JANUS & CYNTHIA JANUS, JANUS
REPORT ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 14 (1992).
27
Hereinafter "EEOC."The EEOC was established to guide the implementation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 & 5 (1988).
28

H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 602.
29

SuSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 368
(1991). Faludi adds that despite this rise, the EEOC decreased the number of suits it
pursued by more than 300% during this period. Id. at 369.
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courts and society acknowledge sexual harassment as a major form of abuse,
30
more and more women will be subjected to this form of sex discrimination.
Sexual harassment has been broadly defined as "the unwanted imposition
of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power.'l The
EEOC has developed two theories of sexual harassment actionable under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:32 "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment"
harassment. 33 Quid pro quo harassment occurs when submission to sexual
conduct is made a term or condition of an individual's employment, or is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting the individual.3 4 Hostile
environment harassment occurs when sexually harassing behavior
unreasonably interferes with an individual's work performance or creates an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.35
Sexual harassment in the workplace often has devastating effects on a
woman's economic36 and employment opportunities.3 7 However, sexual
30 It has been estimated that 81% of all marriages will be duel career by 1995, which
suggests that many more women will enter the workforce in the near future. MCCANN
& McGINN, supra note 24, at 65.

31See

MACKINNON,

supra note 24, at 1.

3242 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1992) [hereinafter Title VII]. The Supreme
Court acknowledged these forms of sexual harassment are actionable under Title VII in
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,63-69 (1986).
Victims of sexual harassment may also bring a federal cause of action against their
employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1992). However, these claims are only
applicable where a state is the employer, since the harassment must occur "under color
of state law." See, e.g., Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 1989); Bohen v. City
of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180,1185 (7th Cir. 1986).
Sexual harassment is also actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 &1985, RICO, and various tort theories. See generally
Jana Howard Carey & Sandra Saltzman Fink, Overview of Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, (in SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION 1993 (PLI Litg. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. H4-5160,1993) Available in WESTLAW, 463 PLI/Lit 7 (discussing
each cause of action).
33

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines].
34
EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.11(a)(1) and (2). Only employees in a
supervisory position are deemed capable of committing quid pro quo sexual
harassment, because it involves the use of one's status or power to threaten another
person's employment. Id.
3
SEEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.11(a)(3).
36

See MACKINNON, supranote 24, at 216-17 ("Sexual harassment on the job reinforces
the economic subordination of women workers because it undercuts a woman's
autonomy outside the home.").
37

See id. at5l ("Women's confidence in their job performance is often totally shattered
by [sexual] harassment."); see also Mary P. Koss, Changed Lives: The PsychologicalImpact
of Sexual Harassment,in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 77-78 (Michele
A. Paludi ed., 1987) (finding that 16% of sexually harassed federal employees reported
adverse employment effects in the form of poor working conditions or diminished
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
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harassment tends to be equally disastrous to a woman's physical health 38 and
psychological well-being.39 Although sexual harassment in the workplace has
been identified as a serious employment problem, the trauma sexual
harassment causes in its victims 40 has received little recognition in our
society.4 1 This has subsequently hindered the realization by the legislature and

judiciary that sexual harassment can cause severe emotional, psychological,
and physical damage in the victim.4 2 Sexual harassment must be

acknowledged as a significantly distressing experience that may cause severe
post traumatic stress reactions in its victims.4 3

This Note will argue that current federal legislation was developed, and has
subsequently been interpreted by the courts, with little or no consideration for
a victimized woman. Instead of addressing the causes and effects of sexual

harassment head-on, the legislature has largely ignored the realities of sexual
harassment as a traumatizing experience faced by thousands of working
women each year. Part H of this Note will address the development and current

state of sexual harassment law, as well as the Supreme Court's ruling in Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.44 Part III will discuss Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder45 as a frequent, yet unrecognized, repercussion of sexual harassment
in the workplace. The last Part of this Note will discuss how the current state

opportunities for advancement, and 9% reported changing jobs as a direct result of the
harassment).
38

See PEGGY CRULL, THE IMPACr OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON THE JOB: A PROFILE OF

THE ExPERENCES OF 92 WOMEN 4 (Working Women's Institute Research Series, Report
No. 3 (1979)) [hereinafter WWI Report] (presenting evidence showing that physical
effects of sexual harassment include headaches, backaches, nausea, loss of appetite,
weight change, insomnia and fatigue).
Substance abuse has also been documented as a direct result of sexual harassment.
See MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 47; Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., No. 3-89-0557,1991
WL 487444 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 4,1991), at *3, affd mem., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
39

See CRULL, supra note 38, at 8 (stating that 96% of harassment victims showed
psychological symptoms such as fear, nervousness, anger, and feelings of
powerlessness).
40

The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,67 (1986),
adopted the term "victim" as referring to a woman who has been sexually harassed at
work.
41BRAVO & CASSEDY, supra note 26, at 42.
42

The courts have been slow and inconsistent in recognizing the significant
emotional effects of sexual harassment in the workplace. See discussion infrapart II.A.2.
Congress did not acknowledge that sexual harassment may cause emotional injury
until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
43

See discussion infra parts In, IV.

44477 U.S. 57 (1986).
45

See discussion infra parts m, IV.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss2/7
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of sexual harassment law perpetuates Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in
sexually harassed women, both before and after a victim enters a courthouse.
II. PRESENT STATE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW

A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In a society where 85% of working women will be sexually harassed on the
job at some point in their working lives,46 it is incredible that there is no express
federal statutory prohibition concerning sexual harassment. Working women
47
are only impliedly protected against sexual harassment through Title VII,
which makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
"discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin."48 The Supreme Court did not grant this limited
protection to women until 1986, when the Court recognized sexual harassment
as a form of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.49

1. Legislative History of Title VII
The Supreme Court's unfortunate delay in allowing women to assert a
sexual harassment claim under Title VII is somewhat understandable,
considering the enigmatic legislative history regarding Title VII's intended
impact on the rights of working women.50 The addition of the word "sex" to
Title VII was proposed only one day before the bill's passage, 51 and its inclusion
is made quite suspect from statements made during House debate. 52 Consid-

46

MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 277 n.2; see also supra note 26 (providing additional

statistics).
4742 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).

4842 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). However, only an employer with fifteen or more
employees that is "engaged in an industry affecting commerce" is regulated by Title VII.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) (1988).
49

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,63-69 (1986). See discussion infra
part II.B.
50See Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 235 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that "the Congressional Record fails to reveal any specific
discussions as to the amendment's intended scope or impact").
51110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964).
52

It appears that including women within Title VII was merely an attempt to impede
passage of Title VII altogether. Representative Smith, who proposed the amendment,
half-heartedly stated, 'I do not think it can do any harm to this legislation. . . I think it
will do some good for the minority sex." 110 CoNG. REC. 2577 (1964). Representative
Celler declared the amendment "illogical, ill-timed, ill-placed and improper," and asked
Congress to wait until "mature studies" have been made before amending Title VII to
protect women. 110 CONG. REc. 2578 (1964).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
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ering that the amendment's primary supporter voted against its passage,5 3
most of the arguments to include women within Title VII prove hypocritical at
best.54 One court has suggested that the legislative history of Title VII makes it
clear that the term "sex" was only added as a prohibited classification as "a last
minute attempt by opponents to block passage of the Civil Rights Bill"
altogether.55
While this legislative history may appear inconsequential in light of Title
VII's passage, the history illustrates the tenuous ground on which women's
rights in the workplace are based.56 If Congress placed so little emphasis on
including women within the protection of Title VIL it may be surmised that
Congress did not address the damaging emotional effects that sexually
harassing behavior has on its victims. Congress did not mention or consider
sexual harassment when Title VII was passed.5 7 Amazingly, however, Title VII
remains the only source of federal sexual harassment law available to working
women who have been victimized by such conduct. 58
2. Early Court Interpretation of Title VII
This less than instructive legislative history led to quite limited applications
of Title VII,59 especially in workplace sexual harassment claims. Not
surprisingly, four of the first five federal courts to consider sexual harassment
in the workplace found no Title VII violations.60 Characterizing sexually

53
See 110 CONG. REc. 2804 (1964), for Representative Smith's negative vote on the
amendment.

54See, e.g., 110 CoNG. REc. 2584 (1964) ('Many of the people who are most ardent in
support of [the amendment] were among those who ... were the strongest in their
opposition to a very simple bill to provide equal pay for equal work for women."
(remarks of Representative Green)).
55Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 297 n.12 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
56

0ne commentator has suggested that extending Title VII to prohibit sexual
harassment is improper because the legislative history does not show Congress
intended to regulate sexual activity in the workplace. Michelle R. Pierce, Sexual
Harassmentand Title VII-A Better Solution, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1092-99 (1989).
57
See Theodore F. Claypoole, Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law: The Need for Sexual
HarassmentLegislation, 48 OHIo ST. LJ. 1151, 1152 (1987) (Title VIl's "sparse legislative
history" shows that Congress made no attempt to address or resolve sexual harassment
issues currently being debated).
58
See infra part IV.B.3, for discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
significantly amended Title VII.

59 But see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) ("'What is
required by Congress [under Title VII] is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification."') (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430-31 (1971)).
60
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553,556 (D.NJ. 1976) (sexual
harassment is not discrimination under Title VII), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977);

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss2/7
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harassing behavior as "nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or
mannerism"61 and merely a "subtlet[y] of an inharmonious personal
relationship,"6 2 these courts relinquished a woman's position in the workplace
to that of nothing more than a sexual commodity. As one concurring judge so
callously stated, "sexual advances may not be intrinsically offensive, and no
policy can be derived from the equal employment opportunity laws to
discourage them .... [They are] social patterns that to some extent are normal
and expectable." 63
It was not until the late 1970's that a federal district court held that sexual
harassment in the workplace violates Title VII. The court in Williams v. Saxbe64
explicitly disagreed with the defendant's proposition that sexual harassment
in the workplace is an "isolated personal incident which should not be the
concern of the courts,"65 and found the employer liable for a supervisor's
sexual harassment of a female employee. 66 This case proved to be a catalyst for
the federal district courts' reinterpretation of Title V11.67 Since the Williams
decision, all federal courts have recognized that sexual harassment in the
68
workplace may violate Title VII under certain circumstances.
Although Title VII may be considered a coup for working women in some
respects, the reality is that a woman's "right to work in an environment free
from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult"69 is only inferred from
Title VII. While Title VII does grant women a cause of action for workplace

Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 235-36 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (court would not
recognize a Title VII claim where plaintiff did not use department established by
employer to investigate such claims), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch
& Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (woman subjected to verbal and
physical sexual advances failed to state a claim under Title VII), vacated mem., 562 F.2d
55 (9th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124-25 (D.D.C.
1974) (plaintiff fired for refusing her male superior's sexual advances failed to state a
claim under Title VII), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
61
62

Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
Barnes, 561 F.2d at 986 (quoting Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123

(D.D.C. 1974)).
63

Barnes, 561 F.2d at 1001 (MacKinnon, J. concurring).

64413 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that retaliatory actions of a male
supervisor taken after a female employee refused his sexual advances created an
"artificial barrier to employment" thatconstituted sex discrimination in violation of Title
VII), rev'd in partand vacated in partsub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (1978).
65

1d. at 660.

66

Id.

67

For example, the four federal district court cases listed supra note 60 were reversed
on appeal directly following the decision in Williams.
68

See RALPH H. BAXTER, JR. & LYNNE C. HERMLE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE 8 n.2 (1989).
69

Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,65 (1986).
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sexual harassment, Title VII does nothing to ameliorate the emotional obstacles
a victim is required to overcome before asserting such a claim.70 Subsequent
applications of Title VII reinforce the fact that current sexual harassment laws
do not consider a woman's experience when determining how and when to
hold an employer liable for such forms of sexual discrimination.
B. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,71 decided in 1986, was the first Title VII
sexual harassment case to reach the Supreme Court. This case remained the
Court's sole ruling on the issue until fairly recently.72 The Court in Metor
established that sexual harassment in the workplace constitutes sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII.73
However, the Court failed to resolve many important issues regarding sexual
harassment, which has led to varied and inconsistent interpretations of Title
VII by lower courts. The lack of uniformly applied legal boundaries to sexual
harassment cases has hampered any substantive developments aimed at
eradicating sexual harassment from the workplace. The history of the Meritor
decision illustrates how the Court has perpetuated the emotional trauma a
sexually harassed woman endures when attempting to hold her employer
responsible for such conduct.
1. Factual Background
Mechelle Vinson brought an action against Meritor Savings Bank and her
supervisor, Sidney Taylor, claiming that during her four years at the bank she
had "constantly been subjected to sexual harassment" in violation of Title VII. 74
Vinson alleged that she was forced to submit to Taylor's sexual advances forty
to fifty times over several years, and that Taylor often assaulted or forcibly
raped her.75 Vinson further stated that because she was afraid of Taylor, she did
not report the harassment to any of his supervisors or attempt to use the bank's
internal complaint procedures. 76
7OSee discussion infra IV.A.
71477 U.S. 57 (1986).
72
See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993) (holding that to be
actionable as abusive work environment harassment, conduct need not seriously affect
an employee's psychological well-being or lead the plaintiff to suffer injury), rev'g, 976
F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992).

73477 U.S. at 73.
74

d. at 60.

75

Vinson also claimed "that Taylor fondled her in front of other employees, followed
her into the women's restroom when she went there alone, and exposed himself to her.
.. "Id. at 60.
76
d. at 61. Taylor denied Vinson's accusations of sexual activity and contended that
Vinson aired them in retaliation for a business-related dispute. "The bank also denied
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2. Lower Court History

The district court found that Vinson was not the victim of sexual harassment
or sex discrimination. 77 The court stated that if Vinson and Taylor did engage
in an intimate or sexual relationship, 78 it was "a voluntary one having nothing
to do with [Vinson's] continued employment or her advancement" at the
bank.79 The district court also ruled that because the bank had an express policy
against discrimination and that neither Vinson nor any other employee lodged
a complaint of sexual harassment against Taylor, "the bank was without notice
and cannot be held liable for the alleged actions of Taylor."80
In light of new developments in sexual harassment law,8 1 the court of
appeals reversed the district court's decision.8 2 Relying primarily on the
"hostile environment" theory of sexual harassment recognized in Bundy v.
Jackson,83 the Vinson court remanded the case to the district court so that it could
determine whether Vinson was subjected to sexual harassment that "illegally
poisoned the psychological and emotional work environment." 84 The most
significant holding in the court of appeal's decision was that the bank was held
strictly liable85 under Title VII for sexual harassment by a supervisory
employee, even though the bank lacked knowledge of Taylor's harassing
behavior.86 The Vinson court explained that "[c]onfining liability .. .to
situations in which a supervisor acted within the scope of his authority
conceivably could lead to the ludicrous result that employers would become
accountable only if they explicitly require or consciously allow their
supervisors to molest women employees."87
the allegations and asserted that any sexual harassment by Taylor was unknown to the
bank and engaged in without its consent or approval." Id.
77

Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37,43 (D.D.C. 1980).

78

The district court did not resolve the conflicting testimony regarding the existence
of a sexual relationship between Vinson and Taylor. Meritor,477 U.S. at 61.
79

Id.

80Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 42.
81Hostile environment sexual harassment was not recognized as a Title VII violation
until after the district court's decision. See EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33,
§ 1604.11(a)(3).
82

Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d. 141, 152 (1985).

83641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that a violation of Title VII may be
predicated on either quid pro quo harassment or harassment that creates a hostile
environment).
84

Vinson, 753 F.2d at 145 (quoting Bundy, 641 F.2d. at 944).
1d. at 146-152.

85
86

1d. at 147.

87

Citing to EEOC Guideline § 1604.11(f), the court added:
[i]nstead of providing a reason for employers to remain oblivious to

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994

11

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:301

3. The Supreme Court Holding
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that an employer may be liable
where sexual harassment by a supervisor creates a hostile working
environment, regardless of whether a plaintiff submitted to sexual advances. 8 8
However, the Court declined to issue a definitive rule on the appropriate
standard to apply in determining an employer's liability.89 This hesitant
decision has resulted in the lower courts applying divergent standards of
90
liability.

The MeritorCourt explicitly disagreed with the court of appeal's application
of a strict liability standard for a supervisor's sexual harassment. 91 However,
the Court stated that it agreed with the EEOC that Congress wanted the courts
to look at agency principles for guidance. 92 In suggesting the use of agency
liability theories for hostile environment sexual harassment claims, the
Supreme Court adopted the definition found in the Restatement of Agency
Second that "a master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment, 9 3 and in instances
where the actor relies upon the apparent authority of the employer.94
Conversely, liability for quid pro quo harassment may be determined using
strict liability principles, 95 because it is premised entirely on the use of one's
authority to threaten the victim's employment status.

Using these bifurcated standards of liability in workplace sexual harassment
claims proves problematic in practice and difficult to justify in theory. A better

conditions in the workplace, we think the enlightened purpose of Title
VII calls for an interpretation cultivating an incentive for employers to
take a more active role in warranting to each employee that he or she
will enjoy a working environment free from illegal sex discrimination.
Id. at 151.
88

Meritor,477 U.S. at 68, 72.

89

1d. at 72.

90

Some courts have held employers strictly liable for supervisory sexual harassment.
See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605-06 (7th Cir. 1985); Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc.,
629 F. Supp. 636,643-44 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Ambrose v. United States Steel Corp., 39 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 30,35 (N.D. Cal. 1985). Other courts have required the plaintiff
to establish employer knowledge of the harassing conduct as a requisite to liability. See
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,905
(11th Cir. 1982).
91
The Supreme Court also failed to adopt the bank's proposed theory of a "notice
standard," which would insulate an employer from liability unless they had actual or
constructive knowledge of the harassment. Meritor,477 U.S. at 73.

92M.; see also EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.11(c).
93

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).

94

1d. § 219(2)(d).

95

See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 603-05 (7th Cir. 1985).
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approach would be to hold an employer vicariously liable 96 for both quid pro
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment. A supervisor uses the
authority delegated by the employer over the employee in both forms of sexual
harassment; therefore, the employer should be held liable for both forms of this
abuse of power.
Holding employers to a less stringent liability standard for hostile
environment harassment suggests that the Court believes a victim is less
traumatized from exposure to an offensive environment than when her
position is explicitly threatened through quid pro quo harassment 9 7 Requiring
that hostile environment harassment be carried out within a supervisor's scope
of employment is ineffective because "discrimination is rarely carried out
pursuant to a formal vote of a corporation's board of directors."98 An employer
can often avoid liability simply by drafting a policy against employment
discrimination, thereby making any sexually harassing behavior purely
personal, and thus, not within the scope of employment. 99
The EEOC Guidelines suggest applying strict liability to both forms of sexual
harassment,10 0 stating that an employer should be liable for such harassment
"regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their
occurrence. "101 While the EEOC Guidelines do not have the force and effect of
law,102 the Supreme Court in Meritor, citing General Electric Co. v.Gilbert,103
acknowledged that they "do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."10 4
The MeritorCourt's suggestion of agency principles in determining liability
for hostile environment sexual harassment in the workplace is also inconsistent
because employers are held strictly liable for discrimination based on race,
religion and national origin under Title VII.OS Applying a less stringent

96

Vicarious liability imposes liability on a person for the actionable conduct of
another based solely on a relationship between the two persons. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990).
97

See Meritor,477 U.S. at 76 (Marshall, J., concurring) (expressing disagreement with
the EEOC's brief suggesting that a different rule of liability should be utilized where the
supervisor's harassment "merely" causes a discriminatory environment).
98

1d. at 75.

99

See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F.Supp 161,163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
100EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.11(c).
10Id.; see discussion infra part IVA.1.
102 Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 560 F. Supp 1172,1198 (D. Del. 1983).
103429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976).
104 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,140 (1944)).
10542 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. IV 1992). See, e.g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp.,
552 F.2d 1277,1282 (7th Cir. 1977) (race discrimination); Young v. Southwestern Sa. &
Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975) (religious discrimination); EEOC v.
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liability standard in determining liability for sexual discrimination violations

suggests that prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace is a less
important Title VII objective than preventing other forms of employment
discrimination. As the Eleventh Circuit argued, "[slexual harassment which
creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit
the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment
is to racial equality."106 Because the effects of racial, religious, national origin,
and sex discrimination are equally offensive and debilitating to one's psyche
and career, there is no plausible reason why an employer should not be held
equally liable.
The Meritor Court further held that sexually harassing behavior must be
"sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment"10 7 to be actionable
under Title VII. The majority of lower courts look to whether a "reasonable
person" would find the sexual harassment severe or pervasive, rather than
determining how a "reasonable woman" would perceive the harassment.10 8
This leaves many women who have been sexually harassed without a cause of
action for hostile environment harassment. 109 Moreover, requiring a woman
to wait until the offensive conduct becomes so pervasive that it destroys her
ability to work will likely cause the woman to suffer significant emotional

trauma as well.
Another intriguing aspect of Menitoris the Supreme Court's instruction that
the lower courts look to whether the sexual advances were "unwelcome," rather
than whether participation in them was voluntary.1 10 However, the Court
failed to define what constitutes "unwelcome" sexual conduct, leaving the
lower courts free reign to determine this term's meaning.11 1 The unfortunate
University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1974) (national origin
discrimination).
106 Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
107Meritor, 477 US. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
10 8But see discussion infra part mII.B.l.a.
109 See, e.g., Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding
no hostile environment where plaintiff was repeatedly sexually harassed and
propositioned by her supervisor); Christoforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 668 F. Supp.
294, 301 (S.D. N.Y. 1987) (finding supervisor's repeated verbal and physical sexual
harassment of the plaintiff ungentlemanly but not severe enough to create an abusive
working environment).
11 0
Therefore, the fact that sex-related conduct was voluntary is not a defense to a
sexual harassment suit under Title VII. Meritor,477 U.S. at 68.
11 1

One circuit court broadly defined "unwelcome" conduct as unsolicited, uninvited,
undesirable or offensive. Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
Other circuits have issued similarly vague definitions of what constitutes unwelcome
sexual conduct. See, e.g., Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,903 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating
that conduct is unwelcome if the employee did not solicit or incite it, and itis undesirable
or offensive).
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result of the vagueness in determining "unwelcomeness" has led to the
evaluation of the victim's conduct, rather than evaluation of the harasser's
conduct. 112 This form of evidence suggests the Supreme Court's interpretation
of Title VII is essentially justifying sexually harassing conduct by shifting the
onus on the woman. The result is the obliteration of the Court's intended
holding, because the question of whether such conduct was unwelcome to the
victim has essentially become whether the harasser is somehow justified in
assuming that a woman's appearance or demeanor means she is asking to be
11 3
sexually harassed or assaulted.
It is apparent from even a cursory examination that the Meritor decision is
not an adequate response to the myriad of problems caused by sexual
harassment. Forcing a sexually harassed woman to justify her conduct further
traumatizes the victim. The ignorance of the emotional harms of sexual
harassment in the workplace reinforces the need for further examination of a
victim's reactions to sexual harassment.
III. EMOTIONAL HARMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT: POST TRAUMATIC STRESS
DISORDER

A. Post TraumaticStress DisorderGenerally
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that employment
discrimination resulting in "[e]ven a temporary layoff' may have adverse
psychological effects on an employee, 114 the Court has not fully addressed the
emotional injuries caused by sexual harassment in the workplace. 115 A
woman's response to sexual harassment in the workplace certainly varies with
who are sexually harassed feel
each victim. Typically, however, women
1 16
helpless, ashamed, degraded, and angry.
Furthermore, victims of sexual harassment may suffer a wide variety of
behavioral and psychological reactions, ranging from depression, nervousness
1 8 While
and diminished self-esteem 117 to a complete emotional breakdown.U
112
As Justice Rehnquist stated, resolving "whether particular conduct was indeed
unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on credibility
determinations committed to the trier of fact.... Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
113

See discussion infra part IV.A.3.

ll 4 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (plurality opinion).
115

But see Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367, 371 (1993) (holding that
sexually harassing behavior need not seriously affect a plaintiff's psychological
well-being or lead plaintiff to suffer injury in order to be actionable as "abusive work
environment" harassment).
116

See WILLIAM M. GREEN, M.D., RAPE: THE EVIDENTIAL EXAMINATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF THE ADULT FEMALE VICTIM 69 (1988).
117

See CRULL, supra note 40; see also BOUMIL & HICKS, supranote 24, at 454 (stating that
sexually harassed women usually suffer a loss of confidence, suspiciousness, disruptive
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the extent of these responses may also depend on the severity of the harassing
behavior, it has been found that 90-95% of sexually harassed women experience
some form of debilitating stress reaction. 119
The documented psychological and emotional responses of sexually
harassed women greatly resemble those of a victim suffering from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (hereinafter PTSD). PTSD examines the various
"human responses to extraordinarily stressful societal and life events" 12 0
manifested in both physical and psychological injuries. In the past decade,
PTSD has emerged as an important concept in our legal system and has been
utilized in a variety of criminal and civil contexts. 12 1
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is caused by a traumatic event, or "stressor,"
that is so severe that it is likely to inflict psychological trauma in most normal
persons. 122 PTSD was first associated with World War I veterans suffering from
a post-war stress reaction.123 Today, Post Traumatic Stress Disorders have been
found in victims of rape, violent assault, incest, and natural or man-made
disasters. 124
It has been found that "[any traumatic incident challenges a victim's belief
that the world is safe and predictable, attacks the victim's former sense of
personal invulnerability, and disrupts the victim's basic sense of self-trust and
anxiety, depression, sleep disturbance, loss of appetite, dysfunctional interpersonal
relationships, and the development of phobias).
118
See, e.g., Kauffmann v. Allied Signal, 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff suffered
nervous breakdown during second medical leave from work as result of supervisor's
sexual harassment); Hansel v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 778 F. Supp. 1126, 1131
(D. Colo. 1991) (plaintiff suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of nearly eight years
of sexual harassment); Gates v. Brockway Glass Co., 93 L.R.R.M. 2367 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(harassed female worker unable to work because of emotional breakdown).
119
See Peggy Crull, The Stress Effects of Sexual Harassmenton the Job, in ACADEMIC AND
WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A RESOURCE MANUAL 133, 138 (Michele A. Paludi &

Richard B. Barickman eds., 1991).

120JOHN P. WILSON, TRAUMA, TRANSFORMATION AND HEALING xii (1989). The American

Psychiatric Association defines PTSD as the development of characteristic symptoms
following a psychologically distressing event that is outside the range of usual human
experience. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL

OF MENTAL DISORDERS 247 (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-lI-R].
12
1Evidence of PTSD is most frequently used as a defense to criminal conduct of
veterans of the Vietnam War. See generally Michael J. Davidson, Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder: A ControversialDefense for Veterans ofa Controversial War, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 415 (1988), for further explanation of PI'SD in this context.
Evidence of a PTSD diagnosis has also been used to disprove consent in rape cases,
in the filing of disability claims and in domestic relations court involving custody
disputes or marital relations. WILSON, supra note 120, at 218.
122 Nancy C. Andreasen, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY 1111519 (HI.. Kaplan et al. eds., 1980).

1231d. at 1517.
124

1d. at 1519.
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trust in the environment."125 Although sexual harassment clearly fits this
definition of a traumatic event, sexual harassment has not been universally
considered one of the stressors that causes PTSD. 126
However, recent analyses of the after-effects of sexual harassment have
recognized that sexual harassment does indeed cause severe trauma. 127 One
researcher has even labeled the effects of sexual harassment on the physical,
emotional, interpersonal, and career aspects of a woman's life "Sexual
Harassment Stress Disorder. 128
Many victims' reactions to sexual harassment resemble those of a victim of
rape or incest, in that its victims display characteristics of intense terror,
reexperiencing the event, hypervigilance, increased arousal, eating disorders,
avoidance of stimuli associated with the event and numbing of general
responsiveness. 12 9 Regardless of this research, the post traumatic stress
reactions suffered by victims of sexual harassment remain largely ignored by
the legislature, judiciary, and society.130
The pervasiveness of womenwho suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
as a result of sexual harassment at work necessitates the recognition that some
forms of sexual harassment do in fact cause PTSD. 131 This, in turn, may prompt
lawmakers to reinterpret the burdens placed on a victimized woman in
asserting a Title VII sexual harassment claim. The Civil Rights Act of 1991132
amended Title VII to allow claimants to recover damages for the emotional

125Billie Lawson, Work-Related Post TraumaticStress Reactions: The Hidden Dimension,
12 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 250,252 (1987) (citing Janice L.Krupnick &Mardi J. Horowitz,
Stress Response Syndromes: Recurrent Themes, 38 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 428,
429 (1981)).
12 6
DSM-IH-IR supra note 120, at 247-48.
12 7See, e.g., Kathryn
Quina, The Victimization of Women, in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 97-98 (Michele A. Paludi, ed., 1990) (finding that sexual
harassment is an experience that women find (1) causes severe trauma; (2) violates trust,
especially when the harasser is in a position of authority, for example, an employer; and

(3) causes secondary social losses (such as being demoted or fired)).
128
See MICHELE PALUDI & RICHARD BARIc AN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: A RESOURCE MANUAL 27 (1991).
129
ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW 89 (1984); see also JUDITH LEWIS
HERMAN,

TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 32 (1992) (arguing that rape victims experience

symptoms similar to the post traumatic stress disorders found in war veterans).
130But see KIRTLAND C. PETERSON ET AL., POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: A
CLINICIAN'S GUIDE 9 (1991) (stating that "as PTSD becomes a more accepted diagnosis,
it is probable that it will be used more often in legal battles").
131 See supra note 18.
13242 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. IV 1992).
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harms133 of sexual harassment. Therefore, women should be able to litigate and
recover damages for the post traumatic stress that often results from sexual
harassment in the workplace.
B. Defining Post Traumatic Stress Disorderin the Sexual HarassmentContext
Applying each element of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder to the realities of
workplace sexual harassment delineates the devastating effects sexual
harassment typically attaches to a woman's psyche. This further illustrates that
in many instances, sexual harassment is a traumatic experience that may cause
PTSD in its victims.
There are five diagnostic criteria required for a finding of PTSD:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

experiencing a traumatic event;
reexperiencing the traumatic event;
avoidance of stimuli associated with the event;
symptoms of increased arousal; and,
duration of the disturbance for at least one month.M

Each element can be identified in certain women who have been victims of
sexual harassment. Research on the psychological impact of sexual harassment
has revealed that most victims suffer "immediate postvictimization
generalized stress responses characterized as a state of psychological shock. "13 5
These responses include emotional numbing, constriction of affect, repeated
reexperiencing of the trauma by intrusive waking images or dreams, anxiety,
and depression. 136 These responses tend to develop into chronic symptoms
13 7
that persist for a considerable length of time.
These physical, cognitive, and behavioral responses are consistent with the
diagnostic criteria for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.138 A detailed look at each
of the elements of PTSD, in conjunction with a victim's typical response to
sexual harassment, illustrates why sexual harassment should be considered an
emotionally harmful experience which may cause Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder in its victims.

133 Section 1981a(a)(1) allows recovery of compensatory and punitive damages
against an employer proven to have engaged in unlawful, intentional discrimination
under Id.
134 DSM-Il-R, supra note 120, at 250. The last element of PTSD, which is
self-explanatory, will not be discussed in this Note.
135 Koss, supra note 37, at 79.
136

1d.; see also PALUDI & BARICKMAN, supra note 128, at 29-30 (listing additional
symptoms frequently found in sexually harassed women).
137

BOUMIL & HcKs, supra note 24, at 455.

138 DSM-1II-R, supra note 120, at 250.
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1. The Stressor
The most crucial element of a PTSD diagnosis requires that the victim suffer
a traumatic experience which would be significantly distressing to almost
anyone. 139 To more effectively illustrate why sexual harassment should be
considered a stressor causing PTSD, the author has divided this definition into
two tests: was the victim subjected to sexual harassment that (a) almost any
woman 140 (b) would find markedly distressing?
a. The Reasonable Woman Test
Requiring that the experience would be distressing to "almost anyone" is
accurate in other contexts of PTSD, since the emotional response to many
recognized stressors is gender-neutral. 141 However, since sexual harassment in
the workplace victimizes women more often than men,142 replacing the word
"anyone" with "reasonable woman" more effectively demonstrates the
emotional effects of sexual harassment. As adopted by some federal circuits in
hostile environment sexual harassment claims,1 43 the reasonable woman
standard examines the female victim's responses to sexually harassing conduct
and determines whether "almost any woman" would find the behavior

markedly distressing.
This standard is necessary based on the sexual mores of our society, which

tend to impose an aggressive sexual role on men and a passive role on
women.144 Women's vulnerability to male power in our patriarchal society has
139

1d. at 247.

14OThis note labels this the "reasonable woman" test. However, if the victim of sexually
harassing behavior is a man, the standard of reasonableness must be altered to those
actions that detrimentally affect a reasonable man. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the sexually harassing
behavior must detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex as the victim in
order to find a Title VII violation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3038 (1993).
141For example, male and female Californians, who suffered through devastating fires
in late 1993 and an earthquake in early 1994, are likely to have similar responses to the
trauma of such man-made and natural disasters.
142 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
143

See Bums v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962 n.3 (1993)
(stating its accordance with other federal circuits that have adopted the reasonable
woman standard); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,878-82 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
female employee states a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment
when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman considers sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (adopting a
reasonable woman standard for Title VII hostile environment claims).
14 4

See Alfred B. Heilbrun, Measurement of Masculineand FeminineSex Role Identities as
Independent Dimensions, 44 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 183, 183-190 (1976)
(stating that normative behavior by women is often described as "submissive, passive,
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long been recognized, 145 and is especially apparent in the workplace
environment. Research has found that "sex-role beliefs will dictate how a
woman who has been sexually harassed is going to feel about the incidenL"146
Since "ordinary women probably find offensive sexual contact and proposals
that ordinary men find trivial or sexually stimulating coming from women,"147
the effects of sexual harassment dearly depend upon the victim's gender.
Women react to sexually harassing behavior differently than men. Women
tend to internalize the offensive conduct through feelings of fear, insecurity,
diminished self esteem, confusion, shame, and guilt.148 While men may also
be the victims of sexual harassment, it has been found that men are more likely
to "interpret relatively innocuous behavior as invitations to sexual contact,"
rather than conduct that threatens their physical integrity.14 9 Men's societal and
workplace status gives them little reason to feel fearful or defenseless from
sexual conduct at work, whereas women remain in a vulnerable position.
Therefore, when evaluating whether a sexually harassing experience was
traumatic enough to bring about Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in the victim,
the experience must be viewed in light of a reasonable woman's response to
such events.
b. The Markedly DistressingTest
Most forms of sexually harassing behavior in the workplace meet the
"markedly distressing" test, since women are not typically flattered by such
conduct.1 50 Rather, women find it demeaning, debilitating, and frightening.
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is widely accepted as the result of traumas
ranging from rape151 to divorce. 152 But sexual harassment, which in many

not aggressive and fearful," while male behavior is frequently described as "dominant,
aggressive, adventurous, opportunistic, and proud of sexual ability").
14 5

See, e.g., Robert F. Conte & David L. Gregory, Sexual Harassment in
Employment--Some ProposalsToward More RealisticStandardsof Liability, 32 DRAKE L. REV.
407, 418 (1982-83) ("Sexual harassment in employment is but one of many means that
male elites have used to exercise and reinforce their historic dominance over women in
the work environment.").
14 6 Inger W. Jensen & Barbara A. Gutek, Attributions and Assignment of Responsibility
in Sexual Harassment,38 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 134 (1982).
14 7 MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 171.
14 8
See PALUDI & BARICKMAN, supra note 128, at 29.
14 9

Id. at 60.

150

See MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 47-8.

151

See PALUDI & BARICKMAN, supra note 128, at 34.

52

1 John P. Wilson et al., A Comparative Analysis of Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome
Among IndividualsExposed to Different Stressor Events, 11 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 793,808

(1984).
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instances causes the same degree of trauma, has not yet received such
recognition.15 3
A traumatic experience likely to cause PTSD commonly includes a serious
threat to one's physical integrity or life. 154 Sexual harassment in the workplace
can be one of the most blatant threats to a woman's physical integrity, such as
when she is physically violated through an offensive fondling, confinement to
a chair,155 forcible rape,156 or physical compulsion to perform oral sex.15 7
Similarly, sexual harassment diminishes a woman's personal integrity by
making her feel denigrated as a woman, or by reducing her to an object subject
to sexual insults, ridicule, or other epithets from her employer.
However, just as not all sexual comments 15 8 and conduct of a sexual nature
occurring in the employment setting are actionable under Title VII,159 not every
form of sexual harassment may be considered traumatic enough to cause
PTSD. 160 Harassing remarks alone, absent a threat of intended physical
contact

161

or an offensive touching, may not universally cause the significant

emotional distress necessary for a proper PTSD diagnosis. 162 It appears that a
15 3

Id.

4

15 Other characteristics of traumatic events include a serious threat to one's close
relatives or friends, the sudden destruction of one's home or community, and witnessing
another person who has recently been or is in the process of being seriously injured or
killed as the result of an accident or physical violence. DSM-I1I-R, supra note 120, at
247-48.
155
See Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1557-61 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (granting plaintiff
$1 million in punitive damages from former employers for outrageous quid pro quo
and hostile environment harassment in violation of Title VH).
156
See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vison, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).
157

See Snider v. Consolidation Coal Co., 973 F.2d 555,561 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that
"no reasonable employee would have continued working for employer under these
circumstances"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 981 (1993).
158

As one court stated, "Title VII is not a clean language act." Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251,256 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,878 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating
that "an isolated epithet by itself fails to support a cause of action for .... hostile
environment" harassment under Title VUI); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 987 (1972) (noting that an employer's "mere utterance" of a remark
which offends an employee does not fall within the proscription of Title VII).
159 See Ferguson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1197-98 (D.
Del. 1983) (stating that "not every sexual innuendo or flirtation gives rise to an actionable
wrong").
160
However, even sexually harassing behavior that is not physically violent may
cause strong fear reactions in the victim, such as feeling a loss of control and a disruption
of her life. See Quina, supra note 127, at 97.
161
A stressor usually involves a physical factor, but it always involves a psychological
component that produces significant emotional trauma. Andreasen, supra note 122, at
1519.
162 See WILSON, supra note 120, at 5 (recognizing that "individual difference variables,
such as personality traits, cognitive style, gender, and intelligence, affect the way in
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threat to one's "physical" integrity implies the need for either intended or actual
physical contact in order to be deemed a traumatic experience causing PTSD. 163
Of course, for a traumatic experience to be legally recognized as causing PTSD
in the sexual harassment context, the intensity and circumstances surrounding
the sexual conduct must be evaluated in light of each woman's response.
Sexual harassment in the workplace may also include a serious threat to the
victim's life,1 64 especially where the victim refuses to consent to the suggested
sexual acts or threatens to expose her supervisor's conduct. 165 Such malevolent
behavior is certain to cause significant fear and emotional distress in the
ordinary person. This is especially true for a reasonable woman who feels
defenseless and trapped in a hostile work environment.
It is not difficult to recognize why sexual harassment, in certain forms, can
be distressing enough to cause Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in its victims.
Nevertheless, in sexual harassment cases, courts have been reluctant to allow
expert testimony regarding the PTSD of a sexually harassed victim, 166 which
signifies the courts' refusal to acknowledge the effects such experiences
actually have on many women.
2. Reexperiencing the Traumatic Event

The second criteria necessary for a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder diagnosis
involves the victim reliving the stressful event through at least one of the

following manners: (1) recurrent recollections of the event, 16 7 (2) recurrent

which stressful events are perceived, appraised and processed"). But see Mari Matsuda,
Public Responses to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,
2336 n. 84 (1989) (describing the physiological and psychological effects of racial
harassment, which include difficulty breathing, hypertension, alcoholism, social
withdrawal, chronic depression, and anxiety neuroses).
16 3

For example, although repeatedly hanging a noose over a minority employee's
desk doesn't involve physical contact, the implied threat should be deemed traumatic
enough to cause PTSD. See Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503,1510
(11th Cir. 1989) (finding the above incident sufficiently severe to constitute a jury
question regarding a racially hostile environment).
164
DSM-E1I-R, supranote 120, at 247-48.
165
See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412,417,426-27 (7th Cir. 1989) (dismissing
the victim's claim of emotional distress where her supervisor threatened to kill her for
refusing his egregious sexual advances).
166

See, e.g., Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1495 (1989) (stating
that theplaintiff's doctors had not persuaded thecourt thatplaintiff suffered fromPTSD,
because it seemed like the "current diagnosis of choice," and the harassment did not
constitute "a credible stressor"), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991); Broderick v. Ruder, 685
F. Supp. 1269, 1273 n.3 (D.D.C. 1988) (declining to accept a doctor's diagnosis that the
plaintiff suffered from PTSD, because his analogies relating other traumatizing events
to a sexually hostile work environment were "not convincing").
16 7
Recurrent recollections of the event involve thoughts, feelings, images and
memories of the event that emerge into the conscious awareness and disturb the victim.
PETERSON, supra note 130, at 16.
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distressing dreams, or (3) suddenly acting or feeling as if the traumatic event
1 68
were occurring again, in response to some triggering stimuli. While only one
of the above mentioned symptoms need be found for a proper diagnosis of
PTSD, 169 sexually harassed women are frequently traumatized by all of them.
Commonly, victims of PTSD are traumatized by recurring intrusive thoughts
of the disturbing experience. These recollections tend to persist in spite of
attempts to forget the traumatic incident and focus attention and energy on
other aspects of life.17 These thoughts may include discomfort over discovered
personal vulnerability, guilt over responsibility for motivating or failing to
17 1 Sexually harassed
prevent the event, and fear of the event's repetition.
women are made to feel vulnerable in a workplace where their physical or
personal integrity is threatened.17 2 Once a supervisor or other employee
discovers this increased vulnerability in a victim, the sexually harassing
behavior may become more intense and frequent.1 73
Furthermore, victims of sexual harassment tend to feel that the harassment
was their fault, or that they did not do enough to stop it.174 Some researchers
have labeled this "behavioral self-blame," which describes the process in which
a victim internalizes the blame and tries to find something in her behavior to
which she can attribute the incident. 175 These feelings of guilt are an escape
mechanism many victims of sexual harassment use to prevent the realization
76
that they are appreciated at work merely because of their gender.1
Moreover, sexually harassed women fear that the harassing incidents will
continue. Unfortunately, this is more of a reality than a fear, since women rarely
incur only one incident of harassing behavior.177

168DSM-nI-R, supra note 120, at 250. This includes reliving the experience through
flashback episodes or hallucinations. Id.
169
1d.
170

Andreasen, supranote 122, at 1519.

171See Janice L. Krupnick & Mardi J. Horowitz, Stress Response Syndromes: Recurrent
Themes, 38 ARCHIvES OF GENERAL PsYcHIATRY 428,431 (1981).
172 CRULL, supra note 38, at 7.
173

1d.

174

See MAcKINNON, supra note 24, at 48.

175Jensen & Gutek, supra note 146, at 128.
176

1d. at 125.

177

See CRULL, supranote 38, at 11 (indicating that 22% of the women polled stated that
they were sexually harassed from one to six months and 28% stated that the sexual
harassment lasted more than six months); see also US. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 21 (1988)
(stating that 75% of sexual harassment victims who experienced verbal harassment and
54% of those pressured for sexual favors reported that they were harassed more than
once).
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Recurrent distressing dreams and nightmares are other forms of
reexperiencing a traumatic event, which occur in over half of the patients
diagnosed with PTSD.17 8 As with other traumatic events, sexual harassment
may pervade a woman's psyche to the extent that normal physiological
functions, such as sleeping, are significantly impaired. 179
Sexually harassing behavior in the workplace also causes intense
psychological distress from exposure to events that resemble aspects of the
experience. Frequently, sexually harassed women find that their fears are
intensified once they return to the hostile work environment. 180 In fact, many
women who return to the workplace after taking a leave of absence realize that
they cannot function under such circumstances, and are forced to leave
permanently.1 8 1
3. Numbing of Responsiveness
The third symptom of PTSD involves a victim's avoidance of the stimuli
associated with the event, or a numbing of general responsiveness not present
before the trauma. 182 If a victim displays at least three of the following
symptoms, this element of PTSD is satisfied:
* avoiding thoughts or feelings associated with the trauma;
* avoiding activities or situations that arouse recollections of the event;
* feelings of detachment or estrangement from others;
* restricted range of affect; and/or
8
* sense of a foreshortened future.1 3
The first two avoidance tactics are present in almost every situation of sexual
harassment, because women who bring such claims are frequently forced to
leave their job, or are instructed by their doctors not to return to such an
environment. 184
Feelings of detachment or estrangement from loved ones or co-workers
commonly seize victims of sexual harassment, in that they find themselves
unable to feel love or trust for others. 185 Victims suffering PTSD also develop
a restricted range of affect, meaning that their ability to feel emotions, especially
178

See MARDI HOROwiTz ET AL., SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS OF POST TRAUMATIc STREss

DisoRDER 37 (1980).
17 9

1d.
180 MCCANN & MCGINN, supra note 24, at 105.
181
See, e.g., Kauffmann v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 181 (6th Cir. 1992).
182This response has also been labeled as "psychic numbing" or "emotional
anesthesia," which resembles a typical withdrawal response from much of hereveryday
life. DSM-ffl-R, supra note 120, at 248.
18 3DSM-ImI-R,
supra note 120, at 250.
18 4See,
e.g., Snider v. Consolidation Coal Co., 973 F.2d 555, 557 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 981 (1993).
185DSM-m[I-R, supra note 120, at 250.
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those associated with intimacy, tenderness and sexuality, is markedly
decreased. 186
A PTSD victim may also feel that her future is foreshortened. For example,
187
she may lose all hope of having a career, family or children. Most often, a
sexually harassed woman feels her career has been cut short. This stems from
a belief that her job is either made explicitly contingent on her submission to a
the
supervisor's sexual advances, or because the hostile environment causes
188
victim to leave her job, since her performance is significantly hindered.
189
Sexually harassed women frequently develop a general mistrust of men.
This mistrust may significantly affect a current relationship, or detract from the
victim's desire to seek out a relationship. 190 Hence, the victim sees her chances
of having a family or children decrease. Similarly, victims who already have
families find that it becomes more difficult to love and relate to family
members. 191

4. Increased Arousal
Symptoms of increased arousal are indicated if at least two of the following
are present in the victim:
* difficulty falling or staying asleep;
* irritability or outbursts of anger;
* difficulty concentrating;
* hypervigilance/exaggerated startle response; and/or,
• physiologic reactivity upon exposure to192events that symbolize or
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
referred to as the
Sleep disturbances in the PTSD victim are commonly
193 As discussed earlier,194
"'hallmark of reaction to traumatic experience.'
victims of sexual harassment frequently experience sleep disorders of varying
186

1d. at 248.

87

1 1d. at 250.
188

The WWI Report reported that 66% of the women who responded quit or lost their
jobs as a direct result of sexual harassment. See Christine 0. Merriman & Cora E. Yang,
Employer LiabilityforCoworkerSexual HarassmentUnder Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 83, 84 n.6 (1984-85).
189

See BOUMIL & HICKS, supra note 24, at 454.

190

1d. (stating that one symptom found in most sexually harassed women is that they
become dysfunctional in interpersonal relationships).
191
See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., No. 3-89-0557,1991 WL 487444, at*3, (M.D.
Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991) (stating that plaintiff's relationship with her children became
"strained" as a result of being sexually harassed at work), affid, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
192 DSM-Ill-R, supranote 120, at 250.
193

prERSON, supra note 130, at 27 (quoting VJ. DeFazio, Dynamic Perspectives on the
Nature and Effects of Combat Stress, in STRESS DISORDERS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS:
THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE (Charles R. Figley ed., 1978)).
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degrees. 195 The second element of increased arousal, irritability or outbursts of
anger, are also common themes in PTSD victims. 196 One researcher found that
"'rage at the source of the trauma'" was a typical response in those suffering
PTSD. 197 This rage is also felt by many victims of sexual harassment, who are
made to feel powerless, and fear that their harasser has ultimate control over
their well-being and employment opportunities. 198
Difficulty concentrating, the third element of increased arousal, was found
to be a problem in over 75% of patients with stress response syndromes.199 In
one federal case, a sexually harassed plaintiff stated that she found it "hard to
concentrate on her tasks," because she feared further harassment. 200 These
patients also reported difficulty making decisions, and had trouble
remembering things. 201 It has also been found that during periods of high

stress, such as working in a sexually harassing environment, "even the brightest
individuals and most dynamic [employees] find themselves unable to function
normally or make even simple decisions."202
The fourth element of increased arousal is defined as "hyperarousal,
hyperalertness, and increased autonomic arousal.'eo0 These symptoms are
displayed in sexually harassed women almost universally, in that they act
nervous and jumpy, are easily startled or frightened, and become oversensitive
to typical daily events.2 04
The final symptom of the increased arousal element of PTSD is defined as
the "exacerbation of symptoms on exposure to situations that resemble the
traumatic event."205 This occurs when a traumatized victim re-enters the
environment that caused her to suffer the post traumatic stress reactions. 206 In
a recent federal district court case, the court found that the sexually harassed
plaintiff "may not ever be able to work in a factory again due to flashback-like
194 See supranotes 175-78 and accompanying text.
195
See, e.g., Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F. Supp. 853,867 (E.D. Okla. 1985) (stating
that the plaintiff's sleep patterns have been and continue to be disturbed due to the
severe sexual harassment she suffered at work).
196pETERSON, supranote 130, at 29.
19 7
19 8

d.
See MCCANN & McGINN, supra note 24, at 90-91.

19 9

PETERSoN, supra note 130, at 28.
Hansel v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F. Supp. 1126,1129 (D.Colo. 1991).
20 1
Id.
20 0

202

MCCANN & McGINN, supra note 24, at 89-90.

203DSM-Ell-,

supra note 120, at 250.

4

20 Lawson, supra note 125, at 252.
205
Andreasen, supra note 122, at 1521.
2 06

DSM-DJI-R, supra note 120, at 250.
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to surroundings similar to those where the sexual
reactions to any exposure
20 7
harassment occurred."
In essence, an individual may experience Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as
a result of any traumatic incident that erodes her faith in her world's safety and
in her own invulnerability.208 Sexual harassment is a significant invasion of a
woman's physical and mental privacy that affects more than pecuniary or
tangible aspects of employment. Sexual harassment may traumatize women to
the extent that they are physically and emotionally paralyzed. Therefore,
sexually harassing behavior must be recognized as conduct that has
victims, much to the same
debilitating emotional and physiological effects in its209
extent as other stressors that cause PTSD responses.
IV. PERPETUATING POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN SEXUALLY HARASSED
WOMEN

A. Legal BurdensPlaced on Victims of Sexual Harassment
Suffering a sexually harassing experience is traumatic in itself, but women
are secondarily traumatized when they attempt to hold their employers liable
for the harassment they endured. Courts impose substantial obstacles on
victims of sexual harassment, such as requiring them to give their employers
notice of the harassing conduct, subjecting them to inappropriate burdens of
proof, and making them defend their past sexual behavior.
These three inequities are not explicitly provided in the language of Title VII.
The fact is, the judiciary has imposed these additional requirements on sexual
harassment victims. Unfortunately, these added burdens can have devastating
effects on a woman suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of
being sexually harassed.
1. The Notice Requirement
One of the many issues a court must face in determining an employer's
liability for sexual harassment of a supervisor turns on whether the victim
notified the employer of the unlawful behavior. While an employer is held
strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment, 210 many courts have insisted on a

2 07

Hansel v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F. Supp. 1126,1131 (D. Colo. 1991).

208

See supranote 125.

209

See WILSON, supra note 120, at 11 (stating that "societal and political attitudes
toward traumatized persons are importantaspects of the recovery environment because
they determine how resources will be allocated to provide the services that are needed
for the victim").
21OCourts originally required knowledge to hold an employer liable for a supervisor's
quid pro quo sexual harassment, but gradually broadened their interpretation of agency
to find employers strictly liable for their supervisor's quid pro quo harassment. See
Claudia L. Cerutti, Differing Standards of Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment of

Working Women, 27 ARiz. L. REV. 155,161-63 (1985).
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"notice requirement" for hostile environment sexual harassment.211 Although
the Supreme Court in Meitor stated that the "absence of notice to an employer
does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability," 2 12 the Court further
suggested that it may in some circumstances. 2 13 Courts have attempted to
justify this bifurcated liability scheme by stating that a supervisor does not
directly invoke the employer's authority in hostile environment harassment,
as they do with quid pro quo harassment 2 14
Requiring that an employer has "notice" of hostile environment harassment
before being held liable places the burden of reporting the incident on the
victim, rather than placing the burden of prevention on the employer. Women
who develop Post Traumatic Stress Disorder from exposure to sexually
harassing behavior are further traumatized by recounting and reliving the
experience. Over 95% of the victims of sexual harassment do not complain or
report the problem due to fear of retaliation and a loss of privacy.2 15 Women
who do report incidents of sexual harassment to company officials are
frequently laughed at, called slanderous liars, 216 or considered "fair game" for
all male employees. 2 17
Requiring the victim to comply with notice procedures ignores the
humiliation a sexual harassment victim suffers. It also gives an employer one
more method of insulating themselves from liability. Furthermore, this notice
requirement perpetuates Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in sexually harassed
women by making them relive the experience, usually in the face of a
supervisor who doubts the victim's allegations.

2 11

See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (actual or constructive
knowledge necessary for offensive work environment claim); Tomkins v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048 (3d Cir. 1977) (actual or constructive knowledge
required); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977)
(ratification of harassment implied by employer knowledge). Courts requiring notice
have not provided a convincing rationale for why this standard is used in sexual
harassment cases and not in other areas of Title VII discrimination law.
212 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
213

1d. at 73 (stating that the plaintiff's failure to notify the employer may have
insulated it from liability had their grievance procedure addressed sexual harassment
specifically).
214Bu tsee id. at 76-77 (Marshall, J. concurring) ("In both cases it is the authority vested
in the supervisor by the employer that enables him to commit the wrong ... there is
therefore no justification for a special [notice] rule, to be applied only in hostile
environment cases.").
2 15
See NEVILLE, supra note 19, at 141 (quoting a statistic found in Ronnie Sandroff,
"Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500," WORKING WOMAN (Dec. 1988)); Snider v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 973 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1992).
21 6 See Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1992).
217

See Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,940 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (manager notified by victim
of her supervisor's harassing behavior told victim that "any man in his rightmind would
want to rape you" and proceeded to ask victim to begin a sexual relationship with him).
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2. Inappropriate Standards of Proof

A plaintiff asserting a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim sets forth a
prima facie case by proving that (1)she was the victim of a pattern or practice
of sexual harassment, and (2) she was denied a benefit which she had a
reasonable expectation of receiving. 218 However, the employer may
successfully rebut the victim's prima facie case merely by demonstrating that
there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying the benefit to the
plaintiff.219
Women suffering from PTSD display a variety of symptoms on which the
employer could base a "legitimate" reason for denying the plaintiff a benefit.220
Clearly, the burden of proof in quid pro quo causes of action falls
disproportionately on the victim. In many federal circuits, the employer is not
required to disprove the sexually harassing behavior alleged 22 1 and is rarely
held accountable for such conduct.
A different burden of proof has been applied in hostile environment sexual
harassment cases. In Henson v. City of Dundee,222 the Eleventh Circuit Court set
forth five elements a plaintiff must prove in order to prevail on a Title VII sexual
harassment claim: (1)the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) the plaintiff
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) this harassment was based
on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of
employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.2 23
3. Admissibility of Evidence Regarding the Victim's Sexual History
In addition to proving each element of a Title VII sexual harassment claim,
a victim is also required to defend her actions in the workplace. Title VII has
no rule excluding evidence of a victim's prior sexual behavior when asserting
a claim against her employer.224 The Supreme Court in Meritor only furthered
this employer's defense by stating that such evidence is "obviously relevant"
as part of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged sexually
218

id. at 953.

219/d.
22

OSee supra part M.A-B.

22 lBut

see Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that employer may

rebut the prima facie case by showing that the complained of conduct either did not
take place or was isolated or trivial).

222682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co.,
805 F.2d 644,648-49 (6th Cir. 1986).
223682 F.2d at 903-05.
224However,
some states have adopted sexual harassment statutes similar to rape
shield laws that limit the admissibility of evidence of a plaintiff's sexual conduct with
persons other than the alleged harasser. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2017(d) (West
1988).
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harassing incident.22 5 Using evidence of a woman's conduct as a defense to
sexual harassment claims reinforces the perception that a harassed woman
somehow asked for what she received, while granting an employer yet another
method of insulating itself from liability.
These legal burdens illustrate that Title VII has been interpreted in such a
manner as to legitimize, if not defend, the sexual harassment of women. Such
an interpretation wholly ignores a woman's reactions to sexual harassment. 22 6
It appears as though the only thought Congress and the courts have given
sexual harassment is how to best deter victims from asserting their rights.
B. Inadequaciesof Title VII Remedies
Once a woman endures the secondarily traumatizing experience of proving
that she has been sexually harassed by her supervisor, the court must follow
§ 2000e-5(g) of Title VII227 in order to grant the victim relief. This section states

that "the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include... reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay.., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."22 8
Back pay, reinstatement, equitable relief or injunctions awarded under Title
VII do not, and cannot, compensate for the psychological and emotional
injuries of sexual harassment. 229 Although the amount of equitable relief
recoverable for a Title VII violation has been expanded by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991,230 Title VII remedies remain wholly unresponsive to the post traumatic
stress a sexually harassed women frequently suffers.
The inherent problem with the remedies available to a sexual harassment
victim under § 2000e-5(g) is that the remedies are awarded entirely at the

discretion of the court. Providing that the courts "may" enjoin the respondent
from engaging in unlawful sexual harassment and "may" grant the victim some
form of equitable relief is equivalent to saying that the court may not. 23 1 The
fact that § 2000e-5(g) does not explicitly require the court to enjoin the employer

22 5

Meritor, 477 US. at 69.
See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35,61-62 (1990).
226

22742 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1992).
228Id.
229
See Sharon T. Bradford, Relieffor Hostile Work Environment Discrimination:Restoring
Title VII's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE LJ. 1611,1616 (1990).

23042 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (allowing a complaining party under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 to recover compensatory and punitive damages).
2 31

See, e.g., Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th
Cir. 1989) (reversing lower court award of $1nominal damages and attorney's fees even
where plaintiff proved that sexual harassment affected her psychological well-being),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).
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from engaging in further sexually harassing practices illustrates the lack of
remedial power Title VII proffers to victims of sexual harassment, as well as
the lack of any real attempt to eradicate sexual harassment from the
workplace. 232
Clearly Congress did not consider victims of sexual harassment when
drafting §2 0 0 0e-5(g), nor did it adequately amend this section through § 1981a
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.233 Applying each remedy available under Title
VII to a sexually harassed woman's emotional state illustrates how current
legislation perpetuates the significant harms of sexual harassment.
1. Injunctive and Affirmative Relief
Section
0e-5(g) states that courts may enjoin an employer from engaging
in future harassing behavior.234 The court may order an employer, through an
injunction, to issue a company-wide antiharassment policy, develop training
and education for its employees and develop disciplinary measures to be
utilized against those found to engage in sexually harassing behavior.235 The
court may also reinstate a sexually harassed victim to her former position if this
would be deemed an "appropriate" remedy.236
Since one of the primary goals of Title VII was to eliminate employment
discrimination, 2 37 issuing an injunction against further sexual harassment
appears to be an adequate response. However, Title VII does not require that
an employer use the most serious sanctions available to punish offenders, 238
such as firing or relocating a harasser. This has led the courts to interpret any
"good faith effort" by the employer to eradicate sexual harassment
a sufficient
response.23 9 Simply ordering an employer to eliminate what may have been
"standard operating procedure 240 is not enough to ensure
that women will be
free from sexual harassment at work.
200

232
Amending § 2000e-5(g) to state that the court "must" enjoin the respondent
from
engaging in unlawful employment practices would more effectively eradicate
sexually
harassing behavior at work.

23342 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. IV 1992).
23442 U..C. §

20

00e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1992).

235See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1541-1546 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (attaching sample policy statements and disciplinary measures
to be
implemented by defendant found to have violated Title VII).
23642 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1992).
23 7

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-430 (1971).

238

Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1992).
See, e.g., Dornheckerv. Malibu Grand Priz Corp., 828 F.2d 307(5th Cir. 1987)
(failing
to hold employer liable for sexual harassment where managementacted within
12 hours
of victim's complaint to separate work areas of the victim and the harasser).
240Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
23 9
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Reinstatement is not an adequate form of relief either. It is simply
unreasonable to expect that a sexually harassed woman would welcome a
court's decision to reinstate her to the very environment that caused her to
suffer such debilitating stress reactions. 24 1 Frequently, women who bring
sexual harassment claims against their employers are stigmatized as
"troublemakers" by both coworkers and their employers. 242 Women tend to
fear these repercussions of complaining about sexual harassment more than
the professional consequences of the harassment itself.243 This fear is justified
since many male superiors treat a complaint as a joke, seeing a victim as "crazy,
weird, or even worse, a loose woman."2 44
There have been situations where an employer has reinstated a victim to
work directly under a harassing supervisor, despite numerous complaints of
his sexual harassment. 245 Reinstating a woman to this hostile environment
facilitates verbal abuse or some other form of retaliatory action 24 6 that may
further traumatize a victim. Clearly, reinstatement is not an adequate remedy
for many women in certain situations.
Sexually harassed women suffering PTSD usually require extensive
rehabilitative therapy 24 7 before recovering enough to reenter the workforce. 248
In many cases, women remain out of the workplace for years following a

241However, women are often punished if they refuse to be reinstated. See, e.g., Morris
v. American Nat'l Can Corp., 952 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir. 1991) (victim's refusal of
reinstatement offer barred further accrual of back pay when employer "sincerely"
claimed it would protect victim from further harassment), rev'd in part and vacated in
part,988 F.2d 50 (1993).
242 See, e.g., Snodgrass v. Brown, No. 89-1171-K, 1990 WL 198431, at *11
(D. Kan. Nov.
26, 1990) (plaintiff acknowledged that women who assert a sexual harassment claim
against their employer are typically labeled a troublemaker.)
243

See MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 49.

244

FARLEY, supra note 19, at 59.

245

See Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff

returned to harasser's department after three reports of his harassing behavior to
company officials went uninvestigated).
246

See Suzanne E. Andrews, The Legal and Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment,

14 N.C. CENT. L.J. 113, 142 (1983) (arguing that injunctions prohibiting sexual
harassment are ineffective because plaintiffs and defendants are not usually the "best
of friends" after a lawsuit).
24 7See Andreasen, supra note 122, at 1524-1525 (suggesting that clinicians employ
relaxation therapy, minor tranquilizers, psychotherapy and physical, social or
occupational rehabilitation therapy to treat patients suffering from PTSD).
248 See Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1550 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (emotional damages
caused by sexual harassment required the plaintiff to undergo psychotherapy for six
months to a year); seealso Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596,614
(W.D. Tex. 1988) (plaintiff's doctor testified that she would require psychiatric care for

the rest of her life, possibly including sexual and behavioral therapy).
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sexually harassing experience. 24 9 Often, victims of sexual harassment who
have reentered the workplace were forced to leave due to the traumatic stress
reactions that surfaced as a result of being reexposed to the environment. 250
Recovering from PTSD requires that a victim avoid situations likely to cause
severe emotional stress or disturbing recollections of the traumatic event.
Reinstating a sexually harassed woman to an environment that is likely to be
even more harassing clearly ignores the significance of PTSD symptoms caused
by sexual harassment. 25 1
2. Recovery of Back Pay
Back pay awards under Title VII seek to compensate a victim for the loss of
wages and other economic benefits resulting from the harassment.252 However,
Title VII imposes a duty on a victim to mitigate economic loss by looking for
other employment. 2 53 This duty ignores the psychological obstacles a sexual

harassment victim suffering from PTSD must overcome. 254 Many sexually
harassed women suffer debilitating stress reactions that greatly affect their

personal and professional lives. These women are frequently unable to work
in any environment for a length of time, due to their learned mistrust of men

255
and diminished sense of personal confidence.
Some federal circuit courts add further injury to a victim by deducting any
unemployment compensation the plaintiff may have received while out of

2 49

See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412,417 (1989) (noting that four years
after bringing her sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff "now has recovered [through
psychiatric therapy] to a point where she can re-enter the workplace on a more
permanent basis").
25

0See Kauffmann v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 181 (6th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff
suffering PTSD is unable to return to work based on psychiatrist's recommendation).
2 51

See Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F. Supp 853, 866-67 (E.D. Okla. 1985) (court
reinstated sexual harassment victim even though it recognized that plaintiff would
"require at a minimum several years of weekly sessions with a psychologist or
psychiatrist" and accepted expert testimony that the plaintiff may never recover from
PTSD symptoms).
25242 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1992).
253

"Interim earnings of amounts eamable with reasonable diligence by the person or
persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce theback pay otherwise allowable."
Id.; seealso Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599,606
(7th Cir. 1985) ("Damages are determined by measuring the difference between actual
earnings for the period and those which she would have earned absent the
discrimination by defendant.").
254 But see Brooms, 881 F.2d at 423-24 (plaintiff excused from duty to look for new work
while completing therapy), overruledby Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526
(7th Cir. 1993).
255

Stockett, 791 F. Supp. at 1549.
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work from their Title VII back pay recovery.2 This contravenes the remedial
powers of Title VII, which does not explicitly require such a deduction. When
a woman is traumatized by workplace sexual harassment to the point where
she is unable to work, collecting unemployment benefits may be the only
source of available income. As the Third Circuit has recognized,
"unemployment benefits should not be deducted from a Title VII back pay
award." 25 7 Limiting a sexually harassed woman's recovery in such a
"draconian ' 258 manner further victimizes a woman for pursuing her right to
be free from harassment in the workplace.
3. Equitable Relief
Another specific goal of Title VII was to "make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful discrimination. 259 Section 2000e-5(g) allows
courts to grant a victim any equitable relief it deems appropriate. 260 However,
the majority of courts had interpreted the phrase "any other equitable relief" to
mean that monetary relief was not available to victims of Title VII
discrimination. 2 61 Before passage of § 1981a of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,262
many women who proved they were sexually harassed in the workplace were
not granted relief,2 63 or received only attorney's fees and a few dollars nominal
damages. 2 64 Therefore, harassment victims saw little reason to sue their
employers under Title VII, since they typically did not wish to be reinstated to
the harassing environment, could not collect monetary recovery, and knew
2 65
their employers would not suffer any meaningful consequences.
25 6 See Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d 1161, 1168 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v.
Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local No. 638,542 F.2d 579,592 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 911 (1977); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850,855 (6th Cir. 1975), affd in
part, vacated in part on other grounds, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
416 F.2d 711,721 (7th Cir. 1969), affd in part and rev'd in part, 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973).
2 57

Accord Craig v. Y&Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 82 (3d Cir. 1983); Brown v. A.J.
Gerrard Manufacturing Co., 715 F.2d 1549,1550 (11th Cir. 1983); Kauffman v. Sidereal
Corp., 695 F.2d 343,346-47 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183,195-96
(4th Cir. 1981), rev'd on othergrounds, 450 U.S. 219 (1982).
258

Horn, 755 F.2d at 607.

2 59

Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 456 U.S. 932, 945 (1982).

26042 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1992).
2 61
BARBARA SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLoYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1452 &
nn.153-56 (1983) (see cases cited therein).

26242 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
2 63

See, e.g., Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1989)
(finding hostile environment sexual harassment but awarding no relief), cert.denied, 493
U.S. 1036 (1990).
2 64

See Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F. Supp. 853,859-60 (E.D. Okla. 1985).

26

5BRAvo & CASSEDY, supra note 26, at 34.
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Section 2000e-5(g) of Title VII was amended by Section 1981a of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991266 to allow the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages for sex, race, religious, and disability discrimination. Section 1981a
was a necessary modification to recoveries previously available under Title VII
and affirmatively resolved the issue of whether victims of sexual harassment
in the workplace may recover for nonpecuniary losses.26 7 The amendment was
also a direct response to the plight of victims of intentional discrimination, who
Congress realized "often endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering while
on the job."268

Section 1981a(1)(a) allows a Title VII claimant to sue her employer for
compensatory damages for emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.26 9 A woman
suffering PTSD caused by sexual harassment usually suffers all of these
emotional damages and more. However, some courts have been wary of
awarding compensatory damages to a sexual harassment victim.2 70 This
hesitant approach suggests that women may remain without adequate
remedies for the sexually traumatic experiences they endured.2 71

Section 1981a amended Title VII to include recovery of punitive damages 272
in order to provide employers with additional incentives to prevent
discrimination in the workplace. 2 73 A claimant may recover punitive damages
under

§ 1981a if it is demonstrated that the employer "engaged in a discrimin-

26642 U.S.C. §1981a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
26 7

Prior to the amendment, courts used their discretion in allowing monetary
recovery for nonpecuniary harms. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 68, 72 (1986) (although the harassing conduct had inflicted no tangible or economic
injury pursuant to Title VII, the employer was nonetheless held liable).
268
H.R. REP. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 20 reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA..N. 549,
552. As one Judge stated prior to the amendment, "it is my belief that employees'
psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily entitled [by Title VII] to
protection from employer abuse." Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,238 (5th Cir. 1971).
26942 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
27
0See Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that
§ 1981a(a)(1) does not apply retroactively, even "assuming ... that [it] would entitle
[plaintiff] to damages on her sexual harassment claim").
27

1But see Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), rev'g, 976 F.2d 733 (6th
Cir. 1992).
272

Punitive damages are awarded for the purpose of punishing the wrongdoer, and
instructing him not to repeat the same actions or conduct, and deterring others from
doing the same wrongful acts. W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF ToRTs § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984).
273

H.R. REP. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 20 reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,

552.
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atory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless
274
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."
However, the unique nature of sexual harassment in the workplace makes
it nearly impossible for a victim to prove that harassment was conducted
maliciously or with reckless indifference. Absent giving an employer notice of
the harassment, which is traumatizing in itself,2 75 a victim becomes embroiled

in a "he said, she said" battle of proving malice. Usually an employer will not
be liable for punitive damages unless an officer, director or managing agent of
the company participated in, or ratified, the harassing conduct. 276 Imposing
these burdens on a victim may make punitive damage awards the exception
rather than the rule,277 thereby reducing their real deterrent effect.
While Section 1981a is a significant step forward for the many victims of
sexual harassment in the workplace, its effectiveness is debatable. Assuming
that monetary awards are enough to "make whole" a sexually harassed woman
whose emotional and physical well-being have been virtually destroyed, the
amount of recovery is limited by § 1981a(b)(3). 278 While limiting a plaintiff's
recovery is a common legislative design, critics have argued that capping
compensatory damages in sexual harassment cases unfairly penalizes
women. 279 The liability caps within § 1981a(b)(3) work more to protect the
employer from excessive liability than to make the sexually harassed victim
whole.

27442 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
275

See supra part IV.A.1.

276

See David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassmentat Work, 742 ALI-ABA 465, 482 n.110 (1992).

2 77

William L. Kandel, Mixed Motives, Sexual Harassment,and the Civil Rights Act of1991,
17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 635,641-642 (1992).
2 78

Section 1981a(b)(3) states:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under
this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded
under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer
than 101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer
than 201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, $100,000;
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer
than 501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, $200,000;
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees
in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $300,000.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
2 79

See BRAvo & CASSEDY, supra note 26, at 35.
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V. CONCLUSION

"[N]o woman should be subjected to an environment where her sexual
dignity and reasonable sensibilities are visually, verbally or physically
assaulted as a matter of prevailing male prerogative... ."280 Similarly, women
should not be traumatized at work to the extent that their psychological and
emotional well-being are completely debilitated. Unfortunately, however,
paid in return for the "privilege of being
these are the prices many women have
281
allowed to work and make a living."
It is not enough to make sexual harassment an "unlawful employment
practice" under federal law. Sexual harassment must be recognized as a
traumatizing experience that causes thousands of American women to suffer
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Once PTSD is accepted both clinically and
legally as a consequence of sexual harassment, the legislature and courts can
begin reevaluating and modifying the present state of sexual harassment law.
JENNIFER L. VINCIGUERRA

282

28

0Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626-27 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
28

1Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 US. 57,67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City

of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
2 82

Ms. Vinciguerra received the Robert Kensey Memorial Award for this Note.
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